CSPE 20th Anniversary Celebratory Conference
Published: 30 April 2025
The Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience (CSPE) has now been in existence for twenty years! We are going to hold a celebratory 20th Anniversary Conference on 4 – 6th June 2025 in Glasgow. We would love for you to join us.
The Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience (CSPE) has now been in existence for twenty years! We are going to hold a celebratory 20th Anniversary Conference on 4 – 6th June 2025 in Glasgow. We would love for you to join us.
We will have a range of philosophy talks on all things sensory that have been core to the work at the CSPE, such as perception, illusion, hallucination, imagination, and the senses. We will particularly hear from those who have worked, visited, and contributed to, the CSPE and its projects and events over the years. We will have virtual reality experiences for conference delegates to try, strobe-induced visual hallucinations, and a whisky tasting. We will have lots of time for informal discussion, and to promote this, we will have a poster session and would encourage all attendees to exhibit a poster summarising a paper that they are working on.
Attendance at the conference is free and includes tea, coffee, conference lunches, and food at the after party for free. Conference dinners are available to purchase when you register for the conference. The number of places at the conference are strictly limited so we would encourage those that wish to come to register for the conference as soon as possible on Eventbrite.
If you would like to attend you must register on Eventbrite, where there are further details of the conference. If you have any questions, please e-mail j.harber.1@research.gla.ac.uk.
We would like to thank the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the Scots Philosophical Association, and the Department of Philosophy for its sponsorship of this event.
We very much hope that you will join us to celebrate the people and work of the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience over the last twenty years.
Conference Programme
Wednesday 4th June
9.00 – 9.30 - Registration and tea and coffee. Poster session set-up.
9.30 – 10.10 - Prof Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow), Welcome to the conference and overview of the CSPE
10.10 – 11.10 - Prof Jack Lyons (Glasgow) “Are Cognitive Maps Really Maps?”
11.10 – 11.20 - Break
11.20 – 12.20 - Dr Andrea Blomkvist (Glasgow) “Memory images: what we can learn from aphantasia”
12.20 – 12.30 - Break
12.30 – 1.30 - Prof Neil McDonnell (Glasgow) “Virtual Reality: Theory and Practice at the University of Glasgow”
1.30 – 2.45 - Lunch – including poster session and virtual reality sessions
2.45 – 3.45 Dr Sam Clarke (Southern California) “Can we “see” value? Spatiotopic “visual” adaptation to an imperceptible dimension”
3.45 – 3.55 - Break
3.55 – 4.55 - Dr E.J. Green (Johns Hopkins) “Perceptual Abstraction”
4.55 – 6.00- Poster session and virtual reality session
7.00 - late - Conference Dinner @ Ka Pao (26 Vinicombe Street, Glasgow, G12 8BE)
Thursday 5th June
9.30 – 10.30 - Dr Derek H. Brown (Glasgow) “Sensory Engineering, Perceptual Mediation, and Indirect Perception”
10.30 – 10.40 - Break
10.40 – 11.40 - Dr Umut Baysan (Oxford) “Emergence: From Consciousness to Normativity”
11.40 – 11.45 - Break
11.45 – 12.45 - Prof Michael Brady (Glasgow) “Trauma, meaning-making, and illusions of growth”
12.45– 1.45 - Lunch – including poster session, virtual reality sessions, and strobe sessions
1.45 – 2.45 - Dr David Bain (Glasgow) “Seven questions about suffering”
2.45 – 2.55 - Break
2.55 – 3.55 - Prof Josefa Toribio (Barcelona) “Valence Unseen: On the Affective Life of Experience in Sensory Substitution”
3.55 – 6.00 - Poster session and virtual reality session
7 .00 - late - Conference Dinner @ Mother India at The Lansdowne (7A Lansdowne Crescent, Glasgow G20 6NQ)
Friday 6th June
9.30 – 10.30 - Dr Keith Wilson (University College Dublin) “Realism About Perspectival Character”
10.30 – 10.40 - Break
10.40 – 11.40 - Dr Robert Cowan (Glasgow) “Beyond good and evil? In your dreams!”
11.40 – 11.50 - Break
11.50 – 12.50 - Dr Brandon Ashby (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg) “The structures of perception and the practical limits of sensory engineering"
12.50 – 2.00 - Lunch – Poster session, virtual reality session, and strobe session
2.00 – 3.00 - Dr Jennifer Corns (Glasgow) “Engineering and Eliminating Pain”
3.00 – 3.10 - Break
3.10 – 4.10 - Prof Robert Briscoe (Ohio) “Depiction as Sensory Engineering”
4.10 – 5.45 - Poster session, virtual reality session, and strobe session
6. 00 - late - Conference after-party (including buffet and whisky tasting) @ Glasgow University Union (32 University Ave, Glasgow G12 8LX)
Titles and Abstracts
Brandon Ashby “The structures of perception and the practical limits of sensory engineering"
Abstract: Much recent work on the philosophy of perception seeks to articulate different kinds of structures that perceptual experience may have. In parallel, some philosophers have also been introduced the idea of sensory engineering: roughly, the deliberate modification of sensory experience to alter, add to, or take away from the standard elements of perceptual experience. Focusing on the syntactic, analogue, and dimensional structures of perception, I argue that perceptual structures place strong practical limits on what kinds of sensory engineering projects are feasible, where this includes but is not limited to the direct modification of perceptual experience itself as well as its cognitive uptake by users of sensory engineering interventions. I provide a taxonomy of different kinds of sensory interventions and elaborate which structures limit their feasibility in which ways. Just as existing sensory engineering projects—such as thermal goggles or sensory substitution systems—have to teach philosophers about the limits of perceptual experience, the philosophy of perception can likewise guide sensory engineers in pursuing fruitful avenues of research.
David Bain “Seven questions about suffering”
Abstract: Owing in part to impressive work by two members of the centre whose anniversary we're celebrating, the last decade has seen a resurgence of interesting in suffering — not pain, not mere unpleasantness, but suffering, conceived as a distinct phenomenon. In this talk, I ask seven questions about suffering as a route to illuminating central themes in recent accounts and identifying key points of consensus, as well challenging the consensus and sketching routes to simpler and better ways of thinking about suffering.
Umut Baysan “Emergence: From Consciousness to Normativity”
Abstract: There is broad agreement that if there are any strongly emergent entities, (i) they depend on some base-level entities; (ii) this dependence cannot be explained purely in terms of the facts that are true of entities at that base level; and (iii) emergent entities are genuinely novel entities, something “over and above” the entities they depend on. Whether there are any emergent entities in this sense is highly disputed, but many have thought that phenomenal consciousness is a good candidate to be emergent in this sense. In this talk, I propose that normativity is at least as good a candidate (if not better). Under certain substantial meta-normative assumptions, some normative facts can be seen as strongly emergent: (i) they depend on non-normative facts; (ii) this dependence cannot be explained purely in non-normative terms; and (iii) normative facts are “over and above” the non-normative facts they depend on. Having laid out this as a possible view about normativity, I discuss its merits and what it means for the study of emergence more broadly.
Andrea Blomkvist “Memory images: what we can learn from aphantasia”
Abstract: Episodic memory is partially defined by experiencing the past as mental imagery. This is supposed to set episodic memory apart from other kinds of memory, such as semantic memory and procedural memory. When a person recalls an episodic memory, they evoke a quasi-perceptual memory image of this event. In this talk, I will present qualitative research showing that people with aphantasia do not experience such a memory image, and that they instead re-experience their personal pasts through a narrative told by an inner voice. I will explore what this means for the characterisation of episodic memory as involving mental imagery, and whether we ought to change the definition in light of it.
Michael Brady “Trauma, meaning-making, and illusions of growth”
Abstract: Post-traumatic growth (PTG) is a term which refers to ‘positive psychological change experienced as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life circumstances’ (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1999, 2001). PTG has been extensively studied by psychologists for the past decades, but has recently been the subject of a range of criticisms – both methodological and conceptual – about what is being measured, and how. This has led some researchers to question whether reports of PTG simply reflect ‘positive illusions’ or ‘coping mechanisms’ in the aftermath of trauma. In this talk, I’ll consider some of the criticisms, show how psychological research on ‘meaning-making’ might encourage it, and then suggest how we should understand growth if reports of PTG are to be veridical.
Robert Briscoe “Depiction as Sensory Engineering”
Abstract: Sensory engineering encompasses any case in which sensory information is altered or guided with the intention of introducing new veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory elements into perceptual experience. In this talk, I argue that reasons for thinking that virtual reality (VR) experience is a case of sensory engineering extend to photography, realistic painting, and other familiar types of pictures. I also show that approaching how pictures work from a sensory engineering perspective helps to make progress with debates concerning the relative priority of pictorial surface perception and pictorial space perception when theorizing about depiction.
Derek H. Brown “Sensory Engineering, Perceptual Mediation and Indirect Perception”
Abstract: Sensory engineering is when sensory experiences are altered or guided, with the intention of introducing new perceptual, illusory or hallucinatory elements into them. Familiar examples include perceptual experiences using telescopes, televisions, virtual reality, or augmented reality. Such perceptual experiences are about some “new” item by virtue of a mediating perceptual tool or device. These perceptual experiences are thus extended via a kind of “indirect perception”. I provide a theory of indirect perception that explains various types of sensory engineering experiences. I start with a simple theory of indirect perception by reference to relatively uncontroversial cases (e.g. zoom meetings). From here I isolate numerous decision points that expand the model to more controversial cases. What emerges is a framework for understanding the nature of perception in sensory engineering.
Sam Clarke “Can we “see” value? Spatiotopic “visual” adaptation to an imperceptible dimension”
Abstract: Adaptation is a fundamental mechanism of biological cognitive systems. To many, adaptation is also a litmus test — a tool for discerning what is perceived as opposed to what is merely judged at the level of post-perceptual cognition. In this talk, I will provide evidence for a form of adaptation that challenges this latter suggestion. After clarifying how adaptation is supposed to demarcate the perceptual, I'll describe six experiments which demonstrate adaptation to a seemingly imperceptible dimension: arbitrarily assigned coin value. The experiments show that this adaptation is spatially indexed (i.e., spatiotopic), specific (i.e., pertains to cumulative rather than average value), and otherwise analogous to putative cases of high-level visual adaptation (e.g., number adaptation) in notable respects (e.g., in that the adaptation is not symmetrically bidirectional). Combined, our results force one of two conclusions: Either perceptual adaptation obtains for seemingly imperceptible dimensions, or adaptation does not demarcate perceptual content after all. I'll conclude by presenting several reasons to strongly favour the latter interpretation. (This is joint work with Sami Yousif, UNC.)
Jennifer Corns “Engineering and Eliminating Pain”
Abstract: Both engineering pain in artificial systems and genetically eliminating pain from biological organisms require that pain is an appropriately unified phenomenon. More specifically, engineering pain requires developing a pain mechanism which can be integrated into the functioning of an artificial system and genetically eliminating pain requires a specific mechanism whose operation can be eliminated without undermining the functioning of the biological organism. More than 45 years on from Dennett’s classic “Why you can’t make a computer that feels pain,” I evaluate the prospects for both engineering and eliminating pain. I argue that while many sub-components of paradigmatic pain experiences can be successfully engineered or eliminated, the complex idiosyncrasy of pain continues to undermine these prospects. Moreover, I argue that engineering or eliminating pain, as such, often is not and typically should not be what we care about.
Robert Cowan “Beyond good and evil? In your dreams!”
Abstract: Is cheating on your partner in a dream ever morally significant? In this talk I sketch an argument for a positive answer, focusing on the defence of a key premise: there is no morally relevant asymmetry between dreaming and waking such that dreamers are always exempt from moral evaluation.
E.J. Green “Perceptual Abstraction”
Abstract: Perception puts us in touch with highly determinate properties of objects, such as fine-grained color shades and detailed surface shapes. However, most of our immediate perceptual judgments concern more abstract properties, such as the property of being a dog, or of being red simpliciter. So, how does perception attune us to abstract properties despite its evident determinacy? This talk argues that perception can be sensitive to abstract properties in importantly different ways that should be clearly distinguished. I articulate a distinction between implicit and explicit perceptual abstraction and explore its ramifications for debates about the role of concepts in perception. I also propose an empirical criterion for differentiating implicit from explicit perceptual abstraction and apply the criterion to the perception of abstract shape categories. (Based on joint work with Mason Westfall)
Jack Lyons “Are Cognitive Maps Really Maps?”
Abstract: In one sense, to call something a map is to specify what kind of information it carries or what kind of content it has. In another sense, to call something a map is to imply that it carries information in a distinctive kind of way or with a distinctive representational format. My concern is with this second sense and with the various ways in which mental representations can have a format that is interestingly map-like. Some recent authors are quite liberal about what it takes for a representation to be map-like, but I think that a more restrictive view here makes it possible to ask and answer interesting cognitive scientific questions and should open avenues of new research.
Neil McDonnell “Virtual Reality: Theory and Practice at the University of Glasgow”
Abstract: In this talk I will discuss the various virtual and augmented reality projects that we have carried out at the Centre for the Study of Philosophy of Perception and beyond, including Project Mobius, Edify, and Museums in the Metaverse. I will explain both the practical sides of the projects and the theory and policy work that they have engendered.
Josefa Toribio “The Feel Beyond Sight: On the Affective Life of Experience in Sensory Substitution”
Abstract: Users of tactile-visual sensory substitution devices (TVSS) often report little or no visual phenomenology, particularly when congenitally blind. Yet their experiences are nonetheless affectively charged. This paper examines the nature of the affect of these experiences and argues that it is best explained in terms of the psychofunctional properties of their representational vehicles. The proposed psychofunctionalist account is especially well equipped to capture the dynamic shifts in affective response observed in TVSS use over time. More broadly, this approach supports the claim that the affective dimension of perceptual experience—whether in sensory substitution or standard vision—depends less on what is represented and more on how perceptual states are functionally integrated within the agent’s broader cognitive and sensorimotor economy. The analysis thus lends support to a version of impure representationalism, according to which affect is shaped not only by representational content but also by the features of the representational vehicle.
Keith Wilson “Realism About Perspectival Character”
Abstract: Perception is often characterised as an experience of how the world is ‘here’ and ‘now’, i.e. from the subject’s perspective or point of view. Indeed, visual and other sensory experiences are permeated by “situation-dependent” features including spatial perspective, orientation, lighting, auditory, tactual, and other environmental conditions. In this paper I examine how relational or Naïve Realist theories of perception should accommodate the distinctive contribution of such features to the qualitative character of experience. The resulting view takes these features to be (1) mind-independent relations between the perceiver and presented elements, and (2) partly constitutive of the phenomenal character of experience. This yields a simple but powerful explanation of a wide variety of perspectival effects across multiple sensory modalities that compares favourably with existent intentional and Naïve Realist views, and in particular Campbell and Brewer’s view that perception is a three-place relation between subject, object and a spatially located standpoint.
First published: 30 April 2025